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188 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 1999)
L Facts
On February 21, 1994, Thomas Lee Royal, Jr. ("Royal"), Yancy
Mitchener ("Mitchener"), Willie Cardell Sanders ("Sanders"), and Eldred
Acklin ("Acklin") gathered in the parking lot of a shopping center in
Hampton, Virginia. In his recorded confession, Royal indicated that he gave
.25-caliber guns to both Mitchener and Acklin, a .32-caliber gun to Sanders,
and kept for himself a .380-caliber gun.' Once armed, the four men, who
had been drinking and smoking marijuana, left the shopping center parking
lot to find and kill Hampton Police Officer Curtis Cooper.2
Instead, the four men ran into Officer Wallace. Although he realized
that the officer in the police car was not Officer Cooper, Royal fired two
shots into the car and then walked away. Both Mitchener and Acklin also
fired shots into the police car. After hearing the shots, a nearby resident
found the driver's door to Officer Wallace's car wide open, the driver's
window shattered, glass on the ground under the open door, and Officer
Wallace seated in the driver's seat with several gunshot wounds to the head.3
Officer Wallace died four days after the shooting. An autopsy report
indicated that Officer Wallace was shot twice in the head and concluded that
one of the bullets was fatal. A forensic expert later determined that the fatal
bullet was consistent with a .380-caliber weapon, but the Commonwealth
neither recovered any fingerprints from the used cartridges found at the
scene nor ever found the murder weapon.4
Royal confessed to the murder of Officer Wallace in a videotaped
conversation with investigators and later pleaded guilty to capital murder
and a related firearms offense. The court found the future dangerousness
aggravating factor and sentenced Royal to death. Royal's subsequent appeals
to the Supreme Court of Virginia and the United States Supreme Court
were denied.' After the Supreme Court of Virginia denied Royal's state
1. Royal v. Taylor, 188 F.3d 239, 242 (4th Cir. 1999). Royal first told investigators





5. Id. (citing Royal v. Commonwealth, 458 S.E.2d 575 (Va. 1995); Royal v. Virginia,
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habeas petition, he filed a federal habeas petition which the district court
ultimately dismissed.6 On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Royal claimed he
was entitled to habeas relief on the following grounds: (1) he was actually
innocent of capital murder; (2) the Commonwealth violated Brady v. Mary-
land by failing to reveal exculpatory evidence in a timely manner; (3) his
trial counsel were ineffective for (a) failing to pursue a triggerman defense
or obtain experts, the omission of which misled Royal into pleading guilty,
and (b) failing to investigate and put forth mitigating evidence at the sentenc-
ing hearing; (4) the district court erred in denying him discovery; and (5) the
district court erred in refusing to allow him a full year to file his federal
habeas petition.8 Because Royal filed his federal habeas petition after the
effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
his claims were reviewed under that Act.9
I. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit made the
following rulings: (1) Royal failed to produce sufficient evidence indicating
that he was factually innocent;0 (2) because Royal failed to raise his Brady
claim prior to the federal habeas proceedings, it was procedurally defaulted
and thus not entitled to review on its merits;" (3) Royal's counsel was not
constitutionally ineffective in failing to investigate and present evidence that
Royal was not the triggerman, to obtain independent experts, or to develop
and present mitigation evidence at sentencing; ' (4) the district court did not
err in denying Royal's discovery request;" and (5) any error by the district
court in refusing to allow Royal a full year in which to file his federal habeas
petition was harmless. 4
516 U.S. 1097 (1996)).
6. Id. (citing Royal v. Netherland, 4 F. Supp. 2d 540 (E.D. Va. 1998)).
7. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that failure by prosecution to disclose evidence
favorable to accused upon request violates due process when the evidence is material to guilt
or punishment).
8. Royal, 188 F.3d at 243.
9. Pub.L.No. 104-132, 110Stat. 1214 (amending 28 U.S.C. Title 153). See28 U.S.C.A.
S 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999).
10. Royal, 188 F.3d at 245.
11. Id. at 246.
12. Id. at 249.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 249-50.
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III. Analysis lApplication in Virginia
A. Actual Innocence Claim
Royal's claim of actual innocence centered around new evidence
suggesting that Royal did not actually fire the shot that killed Officer
Wallace. Under Virginia law, only the triggerman can be convicted of
capital murder.s The court, however, refused to grant Royal's habeas
petition on the basis of his actual innocence claim because such a claim is
not a ground for federal habeas relief absent some independent constitu-
tional violation in the state criminal proceeding.t 6 Relying on Herrera v.
Collins,7 the court concluded that the proper forum for considering claims
of innocence based on new facts alone is through a state clemency proceed-
ing. 8 The court noted that clemency exists in Virginia, but it did not
mention that clemency is rarely granted and that there are no procedural
safeguards in the clemency process. 9
While actual innocence standing alone is an insufficient ground for
federal habeas relief, actual innocence may be used to open the door to an
otherwise defaulted claim. The court explained that, when new evidence is
at issue, a etitioner may be able to use an innocence claim as a "procedural
gateway "' under Scblup v. Delo.2" To successfully pass through the gateway,
"the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable
juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence."' Meeting
this standard has the effect of reviving claims that would otherwise be
defaulted. The court found undisputed the evidence that Royal was the
only one who carried a .380-caliber weapon that night and that a .380-caliber
weapon fired the fatal shot.2" Thus, the court refused to conclude that no
15. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-18 (Michie 1999). Murder for hire and murder by direction
are the two exceptions to the triggerman rule. Id.
16. Royal, 188 F.3d at 243 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (holding
that claim of actual innocence predicated upon new evidence is not ground for federal habeas
relief)).
17. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
18. Royal, 188 F.3d at 243 (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411, 417).
19. See Brian S. Clarke, In Search of Clemency Procedures We Can Live With: Wat
Process is Due in Capital Clemency Proceedings After Ohio Adult Parole Authority v.
Woodard?, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 5 (1998) (discussing the need for procedural safeguards such as a
hearing and an impartial decision maker in state clemency proceedings).
20. Royal, 188 F.3d at 243.
21. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
22. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).
23. Royal, 188 F.3d at 244-45. In support of his actual innocence claim, Royal pointed
to evidence suggesting that one of the .380-caliber shells found at the scene did not come from
the same gun as the other .380 shells. Although experts could not positively determine if the
shells came from the same gun, the court essentially accepted that they did. Id. at 244.
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reasonable juror would have convicted Royal based on the new evidence
presented.
While claims of actual innocence may often get lost among stacks of
motions and appeals, capital defense attorneys should investigate such claims
and present new evidence as early in the process as possible. While the
Schiup standard may be demanding, once it is met it opens the door for the
court to consider defaulted constitutional claims on their merits. Given the
technical ease with which a claim may be defaulted, any doctrine that
rescues such claims should be used.
B. Brady Claim
In response to Royal's Brady claim, the court agreed with the Supreme
Court of Virginia's ruling that the claim was procedurally barred by Slayton
v. Parrigan24 because it could have been raised on direct appeal.2" For the
court to review Royal's Brady claim on its merits, Royal would have had to
show both cause for the default and actual prejudice, or that failure to
consider the claims would result in a "fundamental miscarriage of justice."26
After Royal pleaded guilty, the Commonwealth informed Royal's
counsel of a .380-caliber gun planted at the crime scene by a state trooper.
Further, after Royal filed his direct appeal with the Supreme Court of
Virginia, the Commonwealth again informed Royal's counsel of planted
evidence-this time a .25-caliber cartridge planted by the same trooper.27
Royal argued that the delays in reporting the planted evidence and the
refusal by the Commonwealth to give him access to statements made by the
other gunmen established sufficient cause to overcome the default of his
Brady claim.2" The court did not explicitly rule on whether or not Royal
had shown cause through state interference; instead, the court found that
the existence of cause was irrelevant because Royal failed to show that the
Brady violation caused actual prejudice.29
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Chief among Royal's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was his
claim that he would not have pleaded guilty to capital murder had his trial
counsel investigated and presented a triggerman defense or obtained quali-
24. 205 S.E.2d 680 (Va. 1974). The court found that Slayton was a valid state procedural
rule. Royal, 188 F.3d at 245.
25. Royal, 188 F.3d at 245-46.




29. Id. at 246.
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fied experts.3" Relying on Anderson v. Warden," the Commonwealth argued
that the claim was procedurally defaulted because the Supreme Court of
Virginia dismissed the claim.3" The Fourth Circuit found that because the
Commonwealth failed to raise procedural default as an affirmative defense
at the district court level, it lost the right to do so on appeal.3 The court
also found that, although it had discretion to default the claim, no "obvious"
reason existed to do so.
3
4
Turning to the merits of Royal's ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
the court applied the two-pronged test established by Strickland v. Washing-
ton.35 To satisfy the test, the petitioner must offer proof of both ineffective
representation and actual prejudice. 36 The court found that Royal failed to
meet either prong of the Strickland test.37 While the court did not find
Royal's counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and pursue a triggerman
defense, obtain experts, or present mitigating evidence at sentencing, this
finding does not mean those avenues should not have been pursued. by
Royal's counsel.38 A capital defense attorney should investigate all possible
avenues. In Royal's case, four .25-caliber shells were recovered near the
front of the police car and two .380-caliber shells were found near the rear
of the car.3 ' The recovery of the extra bullets and the presence of the other
gunmen made the triggerman defense a viable possibility in Royal's case.
The same point can be made about the failure of Royal's counsel to present
certain mitigating evidence at sentencing. If there is mitigating evidence, it
should normally be presented.40
30. Id.
31. 281 S.E.2d 885, 888 (Va. 1981) (holding that when a state habeas petitioner makes
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he cannot dispute his assertions of voluntariness and
adequacy at the plea colloquy unless he can show an adequate reason why he should be
allowed to controvert his prior statements).
32. Royal, 188 F.3d at 246.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 247-48.
35. 466 U.S. 668,687-88 (1984) (holding counsel's representation to be constitutionally
ineffective if it was both objectively unreasonable and prejudicial to the defendant).
36. Royal, 188 F.3d at 248 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88
(1984)).
37. Id.
38. SeeJasonJ. Solomon, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF.J. 315 (1999) (analyzing Chichester
v. Taylor, No. 98-15, 1999 WL 3736 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 1999)).
39. Royal, 188 F.3d at 244.
40. See Susan F. Henderson, Presenting Mitigation Against the Client's Wishes: A Moral
orProfessionallmperative?, CAP. DEF. DIG., Fall 1993, at 32 (discussing implied constitutional
and statutory requirements for presenting mitigating evidence and the various standards of




Finally, Royal's case illustrates why pleading guilty to capital murder
should be avoided whenever possible. Once a guilty plea is accepted and a
death sentence is imposed, many issues are barred from later consideration.
Though a guilty plea may be necessary or reasonable in some instances, the
circumstances surrounding Royal's case did not mandate a plea of guilty.
Guilty pleas, absent agreement that the death penalty will not be recom-
mended or imposed,41 should be considered only in the most extraordinary
cases.
Heather L. Necklaus
41. Counsel should understand that even if the prosecution agrees not to recommend
the death penalty, the trial court may still impose the death sentence. See Dubois v. Com-
monwealth, 435 S.E.2d 636, 637 (Va. 1993) (Commonwealth, pursuant to a plea agreement,
recommended life but the trial judge imposed the death sentence.).
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